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ABSTRACT 
MICELI, MICHAEL J. Effects of the World Trade Center Attacks and Hurricane Sandy:  
 Manhattan Commercial Real Estate Market. Department of Economics, June 
 2014.  
ADVISOR: Younghwan Song 
 
Two rare and uncontrollable events that recently took place in Manhattan were the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Hurricane Sandy. Both of these catastrophic 
events affected the commercial real estate market in Manhattan in several ways. Using 
quarterly time-series data between 1996 and 2013 collected from Brookfield Office 
Properties, this paper utilizes regression analysis to investigate the effects of these events 
on vacancy rate, absorption rate and rent in Manhattan. The regression analyses control 
for location and building type such as Midtown, Downtown and Classes A,B,C, as well 
as economic factors such as unemployment rate and the S&P index. The regression 
results show that rent decreased in Downtown after 9/11 by 22% compared to Midtown. 
Rent showed a similar relationship with Sandy. Absorption rate also significantly 
decreased in Downtown by 4.98% after 9/11 compared to Midtown. Vacancy rate 
showed no significant effects from these two events. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Rare and Uncontrollable Events 
There is always uncertainty following a rare and uncontrollable event. Two 
specific rare and uncontrollable events that this paper discusses are the attacks on the 
World Trade Centers and Hurricane Sandy.  
 September 11
th
, 2001 was an infamous day that affected the lives of all 
Americans. The landscape of Manhattan as a whole and the Manhattan commercial real 
estate market was affected in many ways. The emotional toll that this took on New 
Yorkers cannot be quantified. From a real estate perspective, this was an attack on the 
largest, most prestigious complex in Manhattan. Numerous safety measures have taken 
place for commercial Manhattan landlords since the attack. The most significant change 
was the increase in insurance payments.  
 Hurricane Sandy was also an uncontrollable event that took a major toll on New 
Yorkers from October 22, 2012 – October 31, 2012. The damage done was devastating, 
but in a different way than September 11
th
. Mother Nature was the cause of this event, 
rather than a group of people attacking. There is less of an emotional and psychological 
factor after Hurricane Sandy than after September 11
th
. Many buildings, especially 
downtown, were flooded and lost power. One policy in progress is moving the generators 
and electrical units above the ground floor.  
 Both events affected a similar area and market in Manhattan (Downtown), which 
allows for a unique opportunity to compare the effects. Both also created the cost of 
owning and operating a building to increase tremendously, which has major effects on the 
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market. Economist will be interested in this topic because it will bring more clarity to the 
uncertainty that follows catastrophic events. If there are trends in the market that follow 
uncontrollable events, economists can have a more clear view of the actions that they will 
have to take. This could give commercial landlords a blueprint as to what rents they 
should offer to tenants following the events. This can also help commercial landlords 
position themselves by having a good idea as to how the vacancy rate and absorption rate 
shift.  
 
B. Contribution and Organization of This Paper 
 Previous literature on this subject focuses on either 9/11 or Hurricane Sandy, but 
not both. Abadie and Dermisi (2008) looks at the effects on the Chicago commercial real 
estate market after 9/11, but not Manhattan. It also only utilizes vacancy rate as a 
commercial real estate market indicator. I use vacancy rate as well as absorption rate and 
asking rent. Abadie and Dermisi (2008) concludes that companies moved outside of a 
“high risk” area after 9/11. Larkin (2013) discusses policy changes, including the increase 
in insurance costs after 9/11. After 9/11, there was a separate line on insurance statements 
for terrorism called “TRIA,” as discussed in Bosso (2013). Marcuse (2002) states that 
there was an existing movement of “back office space” outside of the Central Business 
District to a more “decentralized” space. 9/11 just made the process move at a much 
quicker pace.  
 I utilize data from Brookfield Office Properties, a prestigious, worldwide 
commercial landlord. The time-series data was collected from 1996-2013 on a quarterly 
basis. The data is divided by market as well as class of building (A, B, or C). The 
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dependent variables are vacancy rate, absorption rate, and asking rent. These are the three 
main indicators of the commercial real estate market. Vacancy rate shows the amount of 
space available in a certain area. Absorption rate shows the pace at which office space is 
being leased. Asking rent shows the average price that property is being leased for, per 
square foot, in a certain area at a certain time. Independent variables include dummies 
based on time and market, as well as economic indicators such as unemployment and 
S&P 500 index.  
 In Chapter 2 this paper looks at existing literature regarding terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters in relation to real estate. Chapter 3 delves into data description, 
explaining sources of data and describing variables. This is followed by an in-depth look 
at the econometric model in Chapter 4. There are several equations, which are explained. 
The empirical results are then revealed and analyzed in Chapter 5. Finally, the results are 
tied together in my concluding chapter.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Interview Accounts of 9/11 and Sandy 
 Jeremiah Larkin is the President of Leasing at Brookfield Properties, and was in 
the same position in 2001. Brookfield Properties is the landlord of the World Financial 
Center, which is directly across the street from the World Trade Center. In Larkin (2013), 
we discussed the effects on the market in the financial district of Manhattan after both 
9/11 and Hurricane Sandy. In order to understand the effects, one first needs to research 
possible causes. Larkin said that after 9/11 and Sandy, there were several policy changes 
that led to an increase in landlord operational costs, and in effect alters the deals that are 
done with tenants. One example was skyrocketing insurance costs after 9/11 to include a 
new “terrorism insurance.” Another cause was the human nature of being at risk. Larkin 
stated that as the CEO of Lehman Brothers was watching the World Trade Center fall on 
television he called and said he would not be coming back to the World Financial Center. 
They subleased some space and sold their stake in the other space. This shows that people 
wanted to move from high risk areas. 
 Michael Bosso is the President of Operations at Brookfield Office Properties, and 
was a Vice President of Operations in 2001. He was on site after both 9/11 and Hurricane 
Sandy. In Bosso (2013), we discussed the differences between both events and what 
changes have taken place since. Bosso explained that 9/11 had a deep rooted 
psychological effect on New Yorkers, which is consistent with Larkin (2013). After 9/11 
a policy change that Bosso highlighted was the installation of “bomb blast” windows 
from floors 12 and up. He also spoke about the effects of Hurricane Sandy. There was 
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massive flooding in downtown Manhattan, and many electrical units were ruined. The 
steps taken after both events were different, but they both were extremely adverse 
situations.  
 
B. Implications of 9/11 
 Abadie and Dermisi (2008) confirm the idea in Larkin (2013) that people do not 
like to be in high risk areas. Abadie and Dermisi (2008) focuses on the effects on the 
commercial real estate market in the Chicago Central Business District post 9/11. The 
authors choose Chicago because no space was destroyed and there are many landmarked 
and tall buildings. They focus solely on vacancy rate and note that asking rent would not 
be a great indicator because it is only listed for available space and not all space. The 
authors focus on the effects on vacancy rate in a “shadow area” which is a 0.3 mile radius 
of 3 major, landmarked buildings. The authors find that vacancy rate increases as it gets 
closer to at risk buildings, meaning that people wanted to move away from tall buildings. 
 Marcuse (2002) researches both policy changes and the movement of jobs in New 
York post 9/11. Marcuse (2002) agrees that tenants will move from high risk areas, as 
discussed in Abadie and Dermisi (2008). The author states that businesses were looking 
to move “back offices” to a more “decentralized” area, but 9/11 made these changes 
happen at a much faster pace. He notes that headquarters may or may not remain in the 
financial district. Marcuse (2002) also discusses that new developments were being 
stopped in major cities and moved to a more “decentralized” area. Marcuse (2002) agrees 
with Larkin (2013) in the sense that policy changes took place after 9/11. Security 
changes were discussed the most, as landlords must do this to make tenants feel as safe as 
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possible. Policy changes also took place and are continuing to take place after Hurricane 
Sandy.  
 
C. Implications of Sandy 
 The previous papers discuss effects of September 11
th
, but do not discuss the 
effects of natural disasters. Cochrane (2004) focuses on assessing flood damage after 
natural disasters. The author talks about double-counting, which means that one not only 
needs to account for the direct damages, but also account for value added. There is also 
the issue that resources will need to be placed into a certain area, such as direct damages 
and taken from another (ie. a renovation taking place). Cochrane discusses the effect on 
insurance, which is similar to that explained in Larkin (2013). 
 The effect of natural disasters on the economy is the main topic of Toya and 
Skidmore (2007). The authors state that a more developed economy with higher income 
and education are affected less by a natural disaster. The paper uses deaths in a natural 
disaster as an independent variable along with many other economic dependent variables. 
This shows that there is an effect on the economy after a natural disaster. Economic 
factors such as unemployment rate and S&P Index affect the commercial real estate 
market as well. However, they do not directly discuss the commercial real estate market.  
 Bengtsson, Botzet and Esch (1996) research the effect of greenhouse gas induced 
climate warming on future hurricanes. They find the Global Warming will actually 
reduce the amount of hurricanes and intensity of hurricanes. There will be even less 
hurricanes in the southern hemisphere. The authors utilize high resolution climate models 
to back up their results. This is contrary to the popular belief that with Global Warming, 
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come more hurricanes and more intense hurricanes. It is in fact the opposite, which bodes 
well for the future of Manhattan. However, that does not mean that there will not be 
another storm like Hurricane Sandy. 
 
D. Contribution of This Paper 
 The data I used includes vacancy rates, absorption rates, and asking rents for 
markets in Manhattan divided by the building class (A, B or C) unlike in Abadie and 
Dermisi (2008). My paper focuses on two existing markets rather than proposed at-risk 
areas based on radii around tall buildings.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
A. Overview of Variables and Data Sample 
The data used in this paper is from Brookfield Office Properties, a prestigious 
commercial landlord worldwide, including Manhattan. There are three main indicators of 
the state of the commercial real estate market. The dependent variables include vacancy 
rate, absorption rate, and asking rent. Vacancy rate is the percentage of properties in a 
certain area that are available. This is calculated on a quarterly basis. Vacancy rate is one 
of the main indicators of how well the commercial real estate market is at a certain time. 
A high vacancy rate shows that the market is doing poorly and a low vacancy rate shows 
that a market is doing well. Absorption rate is the pace at which real estate units are 
leased in a specific area. This is calculated by dividing the available space by the space 
leased in that quarter. A high absorption rate shows that space is being leased at a fast 
pace, and the market is doing well. A low/negative absorption rate shows that there is 
little space being leased, and the market is doing poorly. Asking rent is a basis of how 
much a unit may be rented for in a specific market. Rent is charged by the square footage 
of a space. A rent may be $40.00 per square foot. Asking rent reflects the supply and 
demand of properties. 
The independent variables include a dummy variable for the location and time of 
the data. The first dummy variable is the market of interest. There are two major markets 
in Manhattan: Midtown and Downtown. The World Trade Center was in the downtown 
market. The quarterly data was gathered from 1996 through 2013, which is time-series 
data. This gives a basis for before 9/11 and after Hurricane Sandy. The second dummy 
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variable is based on time of the data. The time periods will be post-9/11, and post-sandy. 
There are also dummy variables based on the type of building, Class A, B and C.  
The other independent variables are based on the economy in Manhattan. The 
main economic indicator that affects the commercial real estate market is unemployment 
rate. If unemployment rate is high, companies will not need as much office space, but if 
unemployment rate is low, companies might need to expand their commercial footprint. 
The Manhattan unemployment rate was gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The second economic indicator that is especially important is the S&P 500 Index. This is 
the best indicator of how the stock market is doing, and the majority of companies in 
Manhattan over the past 10-20 years were financial institutions. The financial district was 
affected most by 9/11, so this will be a very useful variable. The S&P Index was 
collected from FRED Economic Data. Finally, the last independent variable is total 
inventory. Total inventory is measured in Square Feet (SF), and is the amount of 
commercial space in a certain area. In Manhattan, the total inventory changed after 9/11, 
and this variable will solve for that issue. Inventory was also from Brookfield. 
  
10 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
A. Description of Existing Models 
The econometric equation used in Abadie and Dermisi (2008) is: vacancy rateit 
=α(shadowi×post-9/11t)+ ft+ηi+εit, where vacancy rateit is the vacancy rate in building i 
and quarter t, shadowi×post-9/11t is a dummy variable. The dummy variable has a value 
one if building i is located in the shadow area and the quarter of the observation, t, is after 
9/11. This paper uses a very similar model, but utilizes absorption rate and asking rent as 
dependent variables as well. Instead of using a “shadow area” I use market. This is used 
to see which market was affected most by 9/11 and Hurricane Sandy.  My equations will 
be: 
 
B. Equations and Overview of Model 
                                                                     
                
                                               
                                                                                                                (1)            
 
                                                             
                                                          
                                                                                                 (2)                                                            
 
                                                               
                           
                                
                                                                                                 (3)                                                                                 
 
Dependent Variables: 
vacancy rateit – percentage of office space that is available/vacant at a time t and in a 
market i 
absorption rateit – rate at which available commercial office space is leased in a time t 
and in a  market i    
asking rentit – average rent that is being charged and asked for at a time t and in a market i 
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Independent Variables: 
marketi – dummy variable that indicates market i in Manhattan 
post_9_11t – dummy variable that is 1 for after 9/11 and 0 before 
unemploymentt – percentage of workforce that is unemployed at time t 
s&p_indext – stock market index based on the market capitalizations of 500 large 
companies at time t 
inventoryt – amount of total office space in Manhattan at time t, measured in Square Feet 
(SF) 
classi – dummies for class of building (Class A, B, or C) 
 
All three of the equations are similar, except for the dependent variables. Vacancy 
rate, absorption rate and asking rent are all affected by the economic well-being of a 
certain area. The most important economic factor is unemployment rate because if 
companies are downsizing, they need less office space, which greatly affects the 
commercial real estate market. Another economic factor is the S&P 500 Index, which 
gives an indication of how well financial institutions are doing. I would also like to 
include the rise in insurance costs during this time, but that information is not accessible. 
Abadie and Dermisi (2008) did not research Manhattan because there was inventory lost 
during the attacks on the World Trade Center, but using inventory as a variable will 
remove this issue.  
 
C. Anticipated Results 
 The anticipated results are consistent with Abadie and Dermisi (2008). In 
equation 1, I anticipate the interaction term to be positive for downtown. If true, this will 
show that vacancy rate increases in high risk areas. The coefficient on unemployment rate 
should be positive, because as unemployment rate increases, so does vacancy rate 
because companies need less space. The coefficient on S&P Index should be negative, 
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because if the S&P index is high, it means that companies are doing well financially. 
Finally, the coefficient on inventory should be positive because as more office space 
comes on to the market, vacancy rate will increase.  
 In equation 2, I anticipate the interaction term to be negative. The rate at which 
office space is leased will slow down following both events because of uncertainty. The 
coefficient on unemployment rate should be negative because as unemployment rate 
increases, absorption will decrease because companies will slow their search for new 
office space with fewer employees. The coefficient on S&P Index is anticipated to be 
positive because as the stock market is booming, companies will be looking for larger, 
more luxurious office space. Finally, the coefficient on inventory will be negative 
because with more space comes more challenge in leasing space.  
 In equation 3, I anticipate the interaction term to be negative. Prices of rent should 
decrease to entice tenants to move to an “at-risk” area. The coefficient on unemployment 
rate should be negative because as there are less jobs, companies will be less willing to 
pay a high price for office space. The coefficient on S&P Index should be positive 
because when the stock market is doing well, companies will want more luxurious office 
space and will be willing to put forth the money. Finally, the coefficient on inventory 
should be positive because with a newer, updated supply of office space, comes a 
premium price.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Review of Variables and Regressions 
 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. Vacancy rate has a mean 
of 9.54% and absorption has a mean of 0.07%. Vacancy rate was very high in Class A 
buildings following 9/11, reaching 17% downtown (not reported in the table). Absorption 
also has a minimum that is a negative, which means that more office space came on the 
market than was leased. The maximum rent from the sample is $92.59 per square foot, 
which was in 2008, right before the recession hit. Average rent in Manhattan from this 
sample was $38.73 per square foot, which encompasses Class A, B, and C buildings. 
Inventory in Class A buildings downtown also took a major toll following 9/11, dropping 
by over 10 Million Square Feet (MSF) to 38 MSF (not reported in the table), which 
shows that 9/11 affected a large amount of office space. Unemployment rate in 
Manhattan had a maximum of 8.9%, coinciding with the start of the recession.  
For all regression tables, columns 1-3 use the time variable of September 11
th
, and 
columns 4-6 use the time variable of Hurricane Sandy. Columns 1 and 4 are OLS 
regressions excluding the interaction term to get a base view of the dependent variable’s 
separate relationships with downtown and the time period after 9/11/Sandy. In columns 2 
and 5, the interaction term is included to see if the dependent variable was affected by 
being downtown after 9/11/Sandy. Finally, columns 3 and 6 include year dummies for 
1997-2013 and quarter dummies for quarters 2-4. The number of observations for all 
regressions was 396. The S&P Index variable was divided by 1,000, and the inventory 
variable was divided by 100,000,000 before placed in the regression.  
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B. Effects of 9/11 and Sandy on Vacancy Rate 
 Table 2 shows the regression results using vacancy rate as the dependent variable. 
In column 1, we see that vacancy rate is higher downtown than midtown by 2.2%. When 
including the interaction term in columns 2 and 3, we see that the coefficient is positive 
and insignificant. Looking at the results for the Sandy regressions in columns 4-6, we see 
that vacancy rate is higher downtown than midtown, and the interaction term is still 
insignificant, but now negative. The class dummies give us interesting results in column 
6. As expected, the Class A vacancy rate is lower than Class C, but Class B vacancy rates 
are higher than Class C. This may be due to the fact that if a person is looking to lease 
office space they would either want to save the most money and go with a Class C 
building, or impress their clients and choose to pay a little extra for a Class A space, 
leaving Class B space with more vacancy. But, this is just my conjecture. We see 
unemployment rate and vacancy rate are positively correlated. When unemployment rate 
increases, there are fewer people employed in office space, so companies decide to lease 
less space. Inventory and vacancy rate are also positively correlated showing that if more 
space comes on to the market, there will be more vacant space.  
 
C. Effects of 9/11 and Sandy on Absorption Rate 
 Table 3 reports the regression results using absorption as the dependent variable. 
Looking at column 1, we see the relationship between absorption and downtown is 
insignificant. We also see that the relationship between absorption and 9/11 is 
insignificant. In column 3, the interaction term becomes negative and significant at the 
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10% level. Absorption decreased by 4.98% downtown after 9/11 compared to midtown. 
The results of the Sandy regressions are mostly insignificant. As opposed to vacancy, 
absorption is higher in Class B than Class C, which was expected.  
 
D. Effects of 9/11 and Sandy on Rent 
 In Table 4, the regression results using log(rent)as the dependent variable are 
listed. This set of regressions had the most significant results. In column 1, we see that 
rent is higher in downtown by 18% and higher after 9/11 by 30%. The coefficient on the 
interaction term in column 2 is negative and significant at the 1% level. This means that 
rent decreased downtown after 9/11 by 26% compared to Midtown. This shows us that 
9/11 had a major impact on the level of rents downtown after 9/11. When looking at the 
Sandy regressions we see that similarly, rent downtown is higher by 21%. When 
including the interaction term, we see that rent decreased downtown after Hurricane 
Sandy compared to Midtown. The S&P Index has a positive coefficient, which explains 
that when economy is booming and financial firms do well, they can afford to pay more 
for rent. Also, inventory is positive and significant, explaining that most of the new 
developments are priced higher than the existing buildings on the market. As expected, 
both Class A and Class B space have higher rent than Class C.  
 
E. Overview of Results and Previous Literature 
 Overall, the results were consistent with expectations. Rent and Absorption 
showed results of being impacted by 9/11 and Sandy. Rent decreased downtown after 
9/11 by 22% compared to Midtown. This is a large swing in rental rates, explaining that 
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these two major events had a quantitative impact on the Commercial Real Estate Market. 
Also, several fundamental relationships such as vacancy rate and unemployment rate, 
vacancy rate and inventory, and rent and S & P Index helped solidify the results.          
 Abadie and Dermisi (2008) found that vacancy rate increased in at-risk Chicago 
areas following September 11
th
. After 9/11, I found that vacancy rate had a positive 
coefficient, but was insignificant in Manhattan. Abadie and Dermisi (2008) also did not 
use absorption rate or rent and claimed that rent was not a good indicator. Absorption 
gave us mostly insignificant results, but did show that absorption decreased Downtown 
after 9/11 compared to Midtown. Rent gave the most significant results and was a great 
indicator, showing that rent decreased Downtown after both 9/11 and Sandy compared to 
Midtown. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
A. Conclusion of Results 
 The results of the regressions show us a relationship between the catastrophic 
events of September 11
th
 and Hurricane Sandy with the Manhattan Commercial Real 
Estate Market. Using vacancy rate, absorption and rent as dependent variables we saw 
that there were significant results. Rent gave us the most significant relationship. Rent 
decreased downtown after 9/11 by 22% compared to Midtown. This shows us that 9/11 
had a major impact on rent. Rent also decreased Downtown after Hurricane Sandy 
compared to Midtown. Absorption also decreased after Downtown by 4.98% after 9/11 
compared to Midtown. Vacancy rate did not show significant results following these 
events.  
 
B. Limitations and Recommendations 
 This research was mainly limited by the time frame of the sample. In order to see 
solid evidence of an events effect on an area, there should be six to seven years worth of 
data after the event. After Hurricane Sandy, there are only three quarters worth of data. In 
a few years, there may be more significant results in the case of Hurricane Sandy. Also, 
the data could have been more specific in terms of location. There are 15-20 submarkets 
in Manhattan that could have made the results more descriptive and interesting. Future 
research on the topic should use the submarket data if it is available. Also, if possible a 
focus should also be spent on other major cities after September 11
th
, to see the 
nationwide impact it had on the commercial real estate market.  
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C. Policy Implications 
There have been thousands of policy changes after September 11
th
 and Hurricane 
Sandy. These policy changes are ongoing in the case of Sandy. These policies include 
bomb-blast windows from floors twelve and up, terrorism insurance, and strategic 
placement of generators in the case of a flood. The results from this research do not have 
any major policy implications, but it may give insight to commercial landlords. They can 
look at the results of rent, and in the case of another catastrophic event, alter their rental 
rates based on the two previous events.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all Observations including Dummies 
 
Note: Rent is calculated in constant dollars from 1996.  
 Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Vacancy Rate (%) 9.54 3.48 25.62 1.73 
Absorption Rate (%) 0.07 1.24 5.60 -6.28 
Rent ($ per Square Foot) 38.73 14.99 92.59 6.22 
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.47 1.43 8.90 3.80 
S&P Index  1,177.52 215.69 1,609.49 658.85 
Inventory (Square Feet) 56,231,203 56,004,937 183,000,000 9,923,197 
September 11 0.71 0.45 1 0 
Sandy 0.05 0.21 1 0 
Downtown 0.48 0.50 1 0 
Midtown 0.52 0.50 1 0 
Class A 0.35 0.48 1 0 
Class B 0.35 0.48 1 0 
Class C 0.31 0.46 1 0 
Observations 396 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions of Vacancy Rate in Manhattan During the Period of 1996 
Q1 – 2013 Q2 
 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parenthesis. For columns 1-3, the September 11th is used in row 1 and 3 and 
columns 4-6 use Sandy in rows 1 and 3. In columns 3 and 6 dummies for years 1997-2013 are used along with 3 
quarter dummies (2-4). The S&P Index variable is divided by 1,000, and the Inventory variable is divided by 
100,000,000. 
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9/11 OLS 9/11 OLS 
with 
Interaction 
9/11 OLS with 
Interaction, and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
Sandy 
OLS 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction, 
and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downtown*Sept 
11 or Sandy 
 0.21 
(0.58) 
0.02 
(0.51)  
-0.64 
(1.24) 
-0.66 
(1.10) 
Downtown 2.20*** 
(0.34) 
2.05*** 
(0.54) 
2.29*** 
(0.48) 
2.25*** 
(0.34) 
2.28*** 
(0.35) 
2.33*** 
(0.31) 
Sept 11/Sandy 0.54* 
(0.30) 
0.44 
(0.39) 
1.30 
(1.35) 
1.56** 
(0.72) 
1.89** 
(0.95) 
1.03 
(1.24) 
Unemployment 0.35*** 
(0.11) 
0.34*** 
(0.11) 
0.64* 
(0.38) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.87*** 
(0.32) 
S&P Index -8.20*** 
(0.73) 
-8.20*** 
(0.73) 
-1.54 
(1.73) 
-8.77*** 
(0.81) 
-8.77*** 
(0.81) 
-1.51 
(1.73) 
Inventory 1.29*** 
(0.46) 
1.29*** 
(0.46) 
1.40*** 
(0.41) 
1.33*** 
(0.46) 
1.33*** 
(0.46) 
1.39*** 
(0.41) 
Class A -1.36** 
(0.57) 
-1.35** 
(0.57) 
-1.54*** 
(0.50) 
-1.45** 
(0.57) 
-1.45** 
(0.57) 
-1.54*** 
(0.50) 
Class B 1.23*** 
(0.35) 
1.24*** 
(0.35) 
1.13*** 
(0.31) 
1.17*** 
(0.34) 
1.17*** 
(0.34) 
1.13*** 
(0.30) 
Constant 14.85*** 
(1.37) 
14.91*** 
(1.38) 
10.03*** 
(3.53) 
16.25*** 
(1.55) 
16.24*** 
(1.55) 
8.27*** 
(3.15) 
R-Squared 0.46 0.46 0.61 0.46 0.46 0.61 
Observations 396 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of Absorption Rate in Manhattan During the Period of 
1996 Q1 – 2013 Q2 
 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parenthesis. For columns 1-3, the September 11th is used in row 1 and 3 and 
columns 4-6 use Sandy in rows 1 and 3. In columns 3 and 6 dummies for years 1997-2013 are used along with 3 
quarter dummies (2-4). The S&P Index variable is divided by 1,000, and the Inventory variable is divided by 
100,000,000. 
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9/11 
OLS 
9/11 OLS 
with 
Interaction 
9/11 OLS with 
Interaction, and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
Sandy 
OLS 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction, 
and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downtown*Sept 
11 or Sandy 
 -4.05 
(2.78) 
-4.98* 
(2.57)  
-3.67 
(6.00) 
-4.12 
(5.54) 
Downtown 0.38 
(1.65) 
3.27 
(2.58) 
4.35* 
(2.39) 
0.02 
(1.65) 
0.18 
(1.67) 
0.98 
(1.55) 
Sept 11/Sandy -3.35** 
(1.42) 
-1.57 
(1.87) 
-9.28 
(6.77) 
-4.17 
(3.46) 
-2.34 
(4.58) 
0.87 
(6.28) 
Unemployment -0.57 
(0.52) 
-0.56 
(0.52) 
3.07 
(1.90) 
-0.52 
(0.56) 
-0.52 
(0.56) 
1.21 
(1.63) 
S&P Index 1.49 
(3.48) 
1.46 
(3.47) 
-0.57 
(8.65) 
1.95 
(3.90) 
1.94 
(3.90) 
-1.11 
(8.72) 
Inventory 0.36 
(2.20) 
0.30 
(2.20) 
0.66 
(2.03) 
0.07 
(2.21) 
0.05 
(2.21) 
0.72 
(2.05) 
Class A -0.64 
(2.72) 
-0.80 
(2.72) 
-1.63 
(2.51) 
-0.03 
(2.72) 
-0.02 
(2.72) 
-1.41 
(2.53) 
Class B 0.52 
(1.65) 
0.32 
(1.66) 
-0.24 
(1.53) 
0.90 
(1.65) 
0.89 
(1.65) 
0.01 
(1.54) 
Constant 4.67 
(6.56) 
3.60 
(6.59) 
-19.54 
(17.71) 
1.58 
(7.44) 
1.53 
(7.45) 
-3.62 
(15.90) 
R-Squared 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.20 
Observations 396 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Log(Rent) in Manhattan During the Period of 1996 Q1 
– 2013 Q2 
 
 9/11 OLS 9/11 OLS 
with 
Interaction 
9/11 OLS with 
Interaction, and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
Sandy 
OLS 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction 
Sandy OLS 
with 
Interaction, 
and 
Year/Quarter 
Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downtown*Sept 
11 or Sandy 
 -0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.22*** 
(0.04) 
 -0.28* 
(0.14) 
-0.25*** 
(0.10) 
Downtown 0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.36*** 
(0.05) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.04) 
0.22*** 
(0.04) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Sept 11/Sandy 0.30*** 
(0.03) 
0.42*** 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
Unemployment 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
S&P Index 0.58*** 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
0.79*** 
(0.09) 
0.79*** 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
Inventory 0.43*** 
(0.05) 
0.43*** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.03) 
0.46*** 
(0.05) 
0.46*** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.04) 
Class A 0.32*** 
(0.06) 
0.31*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.36*** 
(0.04) 
Class B 0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.34*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 2.03*** 
(0.14) 
1.97*** 
(0.14) 
2.54*** 
(0.30) 
1.86*** 
(0.18) 
1.86*** 
(0.18) 
2.64*** 
(0.28) 
R-Squared 0.66 0.68 0.83 0.58 0.58 0.82 
Observations 396 
 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parenthesis. For columns 1-3, the September 11th is used in row 1 and 3 and 
columns 4-6 use Sandy in rows 1 and 3. In columns 3 and 6 dummies for years 1997-2013 are used along with 3 
quarter dummies (2-4). The S&P Index variable is divided by 1,000, and the Inventory variable is divided by 
100,000,000. 
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
      
 
 
 
 
